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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. LAMAR HANSEN, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) Case No. 860249 
vs. ) 
CYNTHIA ANN HANSEN, ) 
Defendants and Respondents, ) 
Case No. 860198-CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
FROM THE RULING OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and Appellant, by and through counsel, 
and petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 
This petition is based upon Rules 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals give adequate consideration to 
the issue of whether the findings of fact of the trial court were 
sufficient when compared to the standard set in Smith v. Smith. 
1 
726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) and Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 
(Utah 1982). The findings of fact at issue are those concerning: 
a. Child custody. 
b. Amount of child support. 
c. Division of debts. 
2. Did the Court of Appeals give adequate consideration to 
the issue concerning which party should have been liable for the 
debt owed to Appellant's father? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals give any consideration to the 
issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit into 
evidence the Appellant's psychological assessment? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals give any consideration, 
whatsoever, to Appellant's point of appeal that the trial court 
had abused its discretion in refusing to admit into evidencef on 
the issue of child custody, the psychological assessment of 
Appellant that was prepared by Dr. Reed Payne. 
JURISDICTION 
A. DATE OF ENTRY OF DECISION TO BE REVIEWED: May 12, 1987. 
B. DATE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME TO 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI: Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant filed a 
Motion for Extension of Time on or about May 26f 1987. When 
counsel did not receive any notice from the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court as to whether the Motion had been granted or denied, said 
2 
counsel's paralegal/ Joni Butler, telephoned the clerk's office 
and was informed that the Motion had been granted and that no 
written notice of the same would be sent. 
C. STATUTORY AUTHORITY CONFERRING JURISDICTION ON THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS: Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 3 and 42; Utah 
Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 9. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a divorce case. 
B. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS: The trial of the case 
took place on March 5, 1986 in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in Duchesne, Utah. 
On or about March 10, 1986f Respondent's trial counsel, John 
E. Schindlerf filed and served proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce; on or about March 24, 
1986, Appellant's trial counsel, George E. Mangan, filed and 
served an Objection to the same. 
On or about March 31, 1986, Respondent's trial counsel filed 
and served Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Decree of Divorce which in substantial part were non-
responsive to the modifications sought by Attorney Mangan in his 
Objection. 
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On or about April 2, 1986f Appellant's trial counsel 
withdrew; thereafterf on or about April 14 he filed and served a 
request for the trial court to rule on his Objection to the 
"Proposed Order." 
On or about April 15, 1986, Judge Davidson ruled by minute 
entry that Mr. Mangan's objection appeared to be moot. 
On or about April 1986, the undersigned counsel filed and 
served his appearance as counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellant. 
On or about May 14f 1986, the undersigned counsel filed a 
Notice of Appeal with the clerk of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court. 
Plaintiff/Appellant initially appealed the district court's 
ruling to the Utah Supreme Court whereafter the Supreme Court 
transferred the appeal to the newly-created Utah Court of 
Appeals. The ruling and opinion of the Court of Appeals was 
filed on May 12, 1987. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The facts of the case relevant to the issues presented for 
review have been set forth in the Appellant's Argument, below. 
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ARGUMENT 
This petition is brought for the purpose that the Utah Court 
of Appeals did not apply the law contained within the Utah 
Supreme Court decisions of Smith v. Smith and Hutchison v. 
Hutchison to all of the points which were raised in Appellant's 
appeal. 
The specific instances of error by the Court of Appeals are 
set forth above in the section entitled "Questions Presented for 
Review." 
The heart and core of Appellant's appeal, and the central 
concern in this petition, is that the findings of fact which 
evidence the thought and reasoning process of the trial court are 
grossly inadequate. 
It is the Appellant's contention that the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals was inadequate in addressing the points raised 
in Appellant's brief on appeal. 
Underlying the Appellant's position is this notion: A, 
person has a right to know the process by which the court 
considered the evidence and formed conclusions from the evidence. 
It is the function of the findings of fact to reveal the court's 
thought process. As the issues have been framed for this 
petition, there is indication that even the Court of Appeals did 
not state reasons for denying the Appellant's appeal and 
affirming the decision of the trial court. At both the trial 
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court and Court of Appeals level, a litigant has the "right to 
know" the process by which the court considered the evidencef or 
the points of appealf and formed conclusions based thereon. 
In the very recent (May 22, 1987) case of Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran, 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah 1987)1 the Utah Supreme 
Court repeated the principles by which a trial court's findings 
of fact are deemed to be sufficient. In Acton. the Court ruled, 
The findings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported 
by, the evidence.1 The findings 'should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached.'" (Citing Smith v. Smith, at 426 and Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
We do not mean that the trial court was incorrect, but 
only that the issues are for the trial court to decide and 
that the findings of fact must reveal how the court resolved 
each material issue.... Acton at 9. 
The governing terminology is: 
"must show" 
"follows logically" 
"supported by the evidence" 
"sufficiently detailed" 
"disclose the steps" 
"reveal how" 
1 Although Acton was decided subsequent to the Court of 
Appeals decision herein, it merely reiterates the principles set 
forth in the previous cases of Smith v. Smith and Hutchison v. 
Hutchison. 
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In Acton, the Court concluded that the findings therein had 
been inadequate and that the case should be remanded for entry of 
proper findings. However, the trial judge had since retired and 
the Court ordered that the case be retried. 
In Smith, it was held by this Court that the findings of 
fact rendered by the trial court (11 paragraphs of which 7 
directly pertained to the issue of child custody): 
[Did] not pass muster since they simply [did] not 
demonstrate a rational factual basis for the ultimate 
decision by reference to pertinent factors that relate to 
the best interests of the childf including specific 
attributes of the parents. Smith, at 426. (Emphasis 
added). 
Comparison of the findings in Smith and the findings in the 
present case reveals that the later are similarly inadequate. To 
summarize Smith, the findings were that2; 
- The father had had temporary custody of the child; 
- That the child appeared to have been well cared for 
by the father; 
- That the father appeared to be a fit and proper 
person for the caref custody and control of the child 
on a permanent basis; 
- That the father was employed and the mother was a 
student and had remarried; 
- That the Division of Family Services had submitted a 
report which was admitted as evidence by stipulation of 
the parties and that the trial court accepted the 
statements and findings therein. 
2 Smith at 425. 
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In the present case, the t r i a l court noted the following/ 
a l though t h e r e was no re fe rence made t h a t the comments 
constituted the court 's findings of fact: 
RE! CUSTODY 
- That the mother was the primary care-giving parent, 
that she had been in troublef that she had been working 
very diligently in taking care of the child, and that 
she was the fit and proper person to have custody. 
(Court of Appeals Opinion, May 12, 1987, page 3). 
- That the father had committed "I think" six 
different assaults, which has got to count for 
something. 
RE: CHILD SUPPORT 
[The trial court did not make a single statement that 
could be considered a finding of fact] . 
RE: DIVISION OF DEBTS 
[The trial court did not make a single statement that 
could be considered a finding of fact] . 
On the other hand, the following evidence was taken at trial 
to which the trial court made no. findings of fact or comments 
concerning, and the litigants were left to merely wonder what 
weight or credibility the trial judge had given to such evidence: 
RE: CHILD CUSTODY 
- The effect which the mother's past criminal behavior 
(pleaded guilty to three felony crimes involving 
dishonesty and deception and admitted committing other 
acts of breaking and entering and theft) would have 
upon the best interest of the child. (See Transcript 
at 134, 135, 136, 140 and 141). 
- The home study evaluations wherein Ms. LeAnn Paige 
(Human Services worker for Utah Department of Family 
8 
Services) recommended that the father be awarded 
custody and Larry Heaton (social worker for Utah 
Department of Social Services) recommended that the 
mother be awarded custody. (See Transcript at 166).3 
- The effect which the father's past assaults toward 
the wife and previous wife would have upon the best 
interest of the child. (See Transcript at 119-122, 
146, 148). Particularly in light of the fact that the 
trial court granted the divorce to both parties on the 
grounds of mental cruelty rather than granting the 
divorce to the wife on the ground of physical abuse. 
(Transcript at 221) . 
- The likelihood that either parent's past behaviors 
would continue to occur following the divorce or impact 
the welfare of the child. 
- The facts (against the court's finding that the 
mother was the primary care-giving parent) that: 
— the mother admitted that the father had often 
cared for the baby when the mother was working. 
(Transcript at 119) . 
— the mother admitted that the father had taken 
whis turn" in providing "daily care, feeding, 
clothing, [and] things of that nature." 
(Transcript at 119). 
-- the mother admitted that during the year 
preceding the trial the father had visited the 
child "every Saturday with the exception of seven" 
and on those seven occasions, the mother had asked 
him not to visit for reasons of the child's 
sickness or other family illnesses. (Transcript 
at 118 and 119). 
3 Due to the confidential nature of the home study, the 
reports are not included herewith. It is counsel's understanding 
that a copies are contained in the record which has been provided 
to the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court by the Seventh District 
Court. 
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— a witness, Tom K. Hansen, and the Appellant 
also, testified as to the care that the Appellant 
had rendered to the child, (Transcript at 129f 
186 and 187). 
RE2 CHILD SUPPORT 
Father was making $1,700 per month and was 
supporting four (4) children in addition to the child 
in this case. (Transcript at 228 and 229). 
- The mother was receiving welfare assistance from the 
State. 
- The applicable child support schedule indicated an 
award of $78.00 per child per month and the trial judge 
acknowledged the same. (Transcript at 228 and 229). 
RE: DIVISION OF DEBTS 
- The trial court ruled that the wife pay restitution 
on "any other matters arising from [her] criminal 
matters." (Transcript at 223). 
- Husband borrowed $3f000 from family members to pay 
wife's bail and attorney fees when she was arrested for 
criminal activity. 
Husband and wife each provided conflicting testimony 
concerning how the proceeds of the loan were used. 
(Transcript at 40 and 44) . 
It is correctf as the Court of Appeals noted, that Rule 52 
(a) (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) states that "It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence." Howeverf in this case the trial court did not 
make sufficient oral statements concerning the evidence presented 
and did not identify the few remarks it did make "following the 
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close of the evidence" as "findings of fact" or "conclusions of 
law." 
Finally, Appellant contends that it was error by the Court 
of Appeals to ignore POINT IV which was raised in his brief at 
page 18. The Court of Appeals did not make any mention of POINT 
IV in its decision. In POINT IV, Appellant argued that the trial 
court had abused its discretion in refusing to admit into 
evidence, on the issue of child custody, the psychological 
assessment of Appellant that was prepared by Dr. Reed Payne. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court is free to review questions of law 
and fact and to make findings of its own. Pennington v. 
Pennington. 711 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah 1985). 
In Acton, the Court concluded that the findings therein had 
been inadequate and that the case should be remanded for entry of 
proper findings. However, the trial judge had since and the 
Court ordered that the case be retried. 
In light of the fact that the trial judge in this case, 
Richard C. Davidson, is no longer on the bench in the Seventh 
District, Appellant seeks that the case be retried. In the 
alternative, Appellant requests that the Supreme Court make 
findings of its own based upon the evidence in the record. 
11 
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN 
Randall J. B^olmbren 




IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
A. Lamar Hansen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Cynthia Ann Hansen, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No- 860198-CA 
F I L E D 
Before Judges Jackson, Garff and Billings. MAY 1 2 1987 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Timothy W. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
In his appeal of an April, 1986, judgment and decree of 
divorce, appellant A. Lamar Hansen asserts that the trial court 
erred in: (1) ordering him to pay $140 per month in child 
support; (2) ordering him to pay a $3,000 debt to his father; 
and (3) using an unconstitutional presumption in awarding 
custody of the parties' young son to respondent, Cynthia Ann 
Hansen. He also challenges the sufficiency of the court's 
findings of fact to support the custody award. We affirm the 
judgment below. 
The trial cour 
adjusting the financ 
and its actions are 
Argvle v. Argyle, 68 
Savage, 658 P.2d 120 
trial court's apport 
the absence of manif 
clear abuse of that 
6, 8 (Utah 1982). 
t is permitted considerable discretion in 
ial interests of the parties to a divorce, 
entitled to a presumption of validity. 
8 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984); Savage v. 
1, 1203 (Utah 1983). We will not upset the 
ionment of financial responsibilities in 
est injustice or inequity that indicates a 
discretion. £f. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 
Appellant first contends that he should have been ordered 
to pay only $78.00 per month in child support rather than 
$140.00. This argument is based on his monthly income of 
$1,700 and an obligation to pay child support for four children 
from a previous marriage. He also argues that $78.00 is the 
proper support amount because it is shown on a schedule 
allegedly used in the Seventh Judicial District. 
The schedule was not offered as evidence at trial. If 
offered/ its admissibility would be questionable. The record 
reveals that the trial judge had properly before him lists of 
the parties' myriad debts and meager assets, their tax forms, 
financial declarations, paycheck stubs, and monthly household 
expenses. The judge was informed of their respective earning 
capacities and the fact that respondent had been receiving 
public assistance. He evaluated the support needs of the minor 
child and the parties' relative abilities to meet them. 
Appellant had been paying court-ordered temporary child support 
of $140 since May, 1985, and his payments were current at the 
time of trial. He made no attempt to demonstrate an inability 
to continue making those payments. We hold it was not an abuse 
of discretion for the court to set child support at $140 per 
month. 
Neither are we persuaded that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in dividing the parties' substantial debts. 
Appellant complains that the part of the decree ordering him to 
pay one particular $3,000 debt to his father is inconsistent 
with a previous order of the court directing Cynthia Ann Hansen 
to pay all debts arising out of fines owed for her previous 
criminal convictions. There was, however, conflicting evidence 
about whether the loan of $3,000 was used to pay her bail or to 
pay household expenses. The trial judge considered the nature 
of all the debts, the parties' relative abilities to repay 
them, and their conflicting claims about the use made of the 
$3,000 loan. We see no manifest injustice or inequity in the 
judge's allocation of debts between the parties. 
Appellant next contends that the trial court used an 
unconstitutional preference for the respondent in awarding her 
custody of their 30-month-old son. Such a gender-based 
custodial preference for mothers of small children, called the 
"tender years" presumption, was explicitly disapproved by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Pusey v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
1986), three months after the Hansens' divorce trial. 
At the trial, each party presented evidence of the 
other's lack of fitness as a proper custodian. This included 
evidence of appellant's physical abuse of the respondent, as 
well as his former wife, and evidence of respondent's 
convictions for money order theft, check alteration, and making 
a false statement on a loan application. Appellant claims that 
a gender-based preference was used to tip the scales in 
respondent's favor, based on one highlighted sentence in the 
judge's ruling from the bench: 
860198-CA 2 
Custody of the child will be awarded to 
the defendant. The reason for that is as 
follows: 
The court finds that the defendant is the 
primary care-giving parent. The only thing 
anybody can really say bad about this party is 
that she has been in trouble. 
On the other hand, by the plaintiffs own 
admission he has committed, I think, six 
different assaults, which has got to count for 
something. So if they are going to start 
painting each other black, I think the brush 
will fit both. I don't find any reason to 
deprive her of custody. It seems to have 
worked. I don't see anything wrong with her 
as a custodial parent. From the testimony 
that's been given here, particularly by the 
preschool lady, she has been working very 
diligently in taking care of this child, and 
the court finds that she is a fit and proper 
person and does award custody to her. 
We do not believe the emphasized remark shows any use of an 
improper preference in awarding custody to respondent. The 
trial judge was referring to the fact that, at the time of 
trial in April, 1986, the child had been in the sole custody 
and care of his mother since the parties separated in February, 
1985. His reference to not depriving her of custody reflects 
this fact and shows that he considered which parent the child 
had lived with during the pendency of the divorce. Although 
not determinative, this is one of many relevant factors in a 
custody determination. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 120. 
The judge's oral findings quoted above, recorded in court 
in the presence of the parties, are also germane to the final 
issue raised by appellant. He asserts that the written 
findings of fact pertaining to custody are insufficient to show 
that the award was based on a determination of the child's best 
interests. He relies on Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1986) and Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). 
In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the trial 
court's written findings of fact in a custody dispute were 
inadequate to afford the noncustodial parent a meaningful 
appellate review of the custody award. Smith, 726 P.2d at 
426. The Court described adequate factual findings as follows: 
860198-CA 3 
To ensure that the trial court's custody 
determination, discretionary as it is, 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d at 41, is 
rationally based, it is essential that the 
court set forth in its findings of fact 
not only that it finds one parent to be 
the better person to care for the child, 
but also the basic facts which show why 
the ultimate conclusion is justified. 
Smith, 726 P.2d at 426. 
In the case before us, there is only one written finding of 
fact that relates to child custody: 
10. Defendant is a fit and proper person 
to be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor child of the parties 
subject to the following visitation rights 
provided the plaintiff properly demean 
himself: 
[detailed dates and times of visitation by 
appellant] 
In holding that a custody decision must be supported by written 
findings and conclusions, the Court in Smith cited Hutchison 
and Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The Court concluded that the trial 
judge's statements while ruling from the bench were "not a 
sufficient substitute for adequate findings." Smith, 726 P.2d 
at 426. 
Under the standard enunciated in Smith and Hutchison, the 
one conclusory written finding quoted above, by itself, is 
clearly inadequate to support the custody determination. See 
also Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986). Our 
inquiry, however, does not end here. Subsequent to Smith, 
there was a material amendment of Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). It 
now reads: 
(a) Effect. 
In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A. . . . Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
860198-CA 4 
given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to iudae the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to 
the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of the evidence. . . . 
The emphasized sentences were added by order of the Utah 
Supreme Court on October 30, 1986, and became effective on 
January 1, 1987. The new provisions govern in all actions 
pending on the effective date. £f. Utah R. Civ. P. 1(b).1 
Thus, Rule 52(a) now explicitly authorizes us to look beyond 
the written findings of fact to the trial record and evaluate 
the sufficiency of the judge's oral findings, quoted above, 
rendered from the bench. It is apparent from those findings 
that the trial judge considered and weighed several factors in 
reaching a custody determination that was in the best interests 
of the Hansens' minor son. They includes appellant's history 
of assaultive behavior; respondent's history of criminal 
behavior; the identity of the primary caretaker of the child 
during the marriage; parenting abilities; the stability of the 
child's environment; and the identity of the custodian during 
the pending divorce. Each of these factors is relevant in a 
custody determination. Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d at 426 
(specific attributes of the parents); Pusey v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 
at 120 (identity of primary caretaker, environmental stability, 
custodian during lengthy pendency of custody determination); 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41 (moral character and 
emotional stability of parents, temporary custodian); Martinez 
v. Martinez, 728 P.2d at 995 (ability of each parent to meet 
child's needs). 
1. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no 
further force or effect. They govern all proceedings in 
actions brought after they take effect and also all further 
proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent 
that in the opinion of the court their application in a 
particular action pending when the rules take effect would 
not be feasible or would work injustice. . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 1(b)(emphasis added). 
The first emphasized sentence of amended Rule 52(a) was 
recently applied as the controlling standard of appellate court 
review of a trial court's findings of fact. Ashton v. Ashton, 
733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
860198-CA 5 
We hold that the oral findings made by the trial judge at 
the close of the evidence are sufficient to support the custody 
award and demonstrate that the determination was based on 
factors relevant to the best interests of the Hansens' son. 
They provide this Court, and the parties themselves, with a 
detailed and logical factual basis for the ultimate decision 
awarding custody to respondent, thus satisfying the 
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) and Smith. 
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
860198-CA 6 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
First Interstate Bank Bldg. 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: 637-1783 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********************* 
Av LAMAR HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CYNTHIA ANN HANSEN, 
Defendant* 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 85-CV-42-D 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This matter came on r e g u l a r l y for h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e 
a b o v e - e n t i t l e d Court on the 5th day of March, 1986, t h e 
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, D i s t r i c t Judge , p r e s i d i n g ; 
and, the p l a i n t i f f h a v i n g been p e r s o n a l l y p r e s e n t and 
represented by counse l / George E. Mangan and the defendant 
having been p e r s o n a l l y present and represented by c o u n s e l , 
John E. Schindler and the Court having heard the tes t imony 
p r e s e n t e d and h a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d same t o g e t h e r w i th a l l 
e x h i b i t s of record and further , having rev iewed the f i l e in 
t h i s matter and being otherwise f u l l y informed, now f inds 
as f o l l o w s : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e 
*Fi LE L) 
7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE 
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APR 9 1 1938 
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h e r e t o and the s u b j e c t ma t t e r hereof . 
2. Tha t t h e p a r t i e s h a v e been a c t u a l and bona f i d e 
r e s i d e n t s of Duchesne County, S t a t e of Utah, for more than 
t h r e e (3) months i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o t h e commencement of 
t h i s a c t i o n . 
3 . Tha t t h e p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t were m a r r i e d on 
December 1 1 , 1981 , a t E l k o , Nevada , and h a v e been husband 
and wife s i n c e t h a t t ime . 
4. That one (1) c h i l d has been born to the p a r t i e s of 
t h i s c a u s e , t o - w i t : ARON JIM HANSEN, bo rn O c t o b e r 14 , 
1983. That no o the r c h i l d r e n a r e e x p e c t e d . 
5. Tha t t h e d e f e n d a n t ha s t r e a t e d the p l a i n t i f f 
c r u e l l y caus ing him g r e a t menta l d i s t r e s s and s u f f e r i n g . 
6. Tha t t h e p l a i n t i f f has t r e a t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t 
c r u e l l y caus ing her g r e a t menta l d i s t r e s s and suf fe r ing , , 
7. That the p a r t i e s have accumula ted c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y 
and h a v e d i v i d e d same and t h a t e a c h s h o u l d be awarded the 
p r o p e r t y c u r r e n t l y in t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n wi th the f o l l o w i n g 
e x c e p t i o n s : 
a . One (1) 1974 C a d i l l a c a u t o m o b i l e t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f . 
b. A sewing t a b l e to the defendant* 
8. The p l a i n t i f f i s awarded whatever i n t e r e s t t h a t he 
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shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. December 23 to 6:00 
p.m. December 24 during the year of 1986; during the year 
of 1987 plaintiff shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 to 6:00 p.m. December 26. Thereafter said 
visitation will alternate yearly. 
e. Beginning in the year 1987 the weekend 
visitation will extend to 7:00 p.m. Friday night to 6:00 
p.m. Sunday. 
f. Plaintiff shall have two (2) weeks visitation 
during the summer of 1986 beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday of 
the second weekend in June and concluding the 4th weekend 
in June at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The plaintiff shall give 
defendant ten (10) days written notice of the date which 
will be the first day of his two (2) week visitation. 
g. In 1987 plaintiff shall have three (3) weeks 
summer visitation beginning the second weekend in June- and 
concluding on the second weekend thereafter. 
4. That each party be and is hereby.awarded the 
personal property currently in their possession with the 
following exceptions: 
a. One (1) 1974 Cadillac automobile shall be and 
is hereby awarded to the plaintiff. 
b. One (1) sewing table shall be and is hereby 
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may have in t h i r t y - f i v e (35) a c r e s l o c a t e d near C l e v e l a n d , 
Emery County, S t a t e of Utah. 
9. That t h e p a r t i e s h a v e a c q u i r e d c e r t a i n d e b t s 
dur ing the c o u r s e of t h e i r marr iage which s h a l l be d i s p o s e d 
of as f o l l o w s : 
A, P l a i n t i f f s h a l l assume and pay the f o l l o w i n g 
o b l i g a t i o n s and h o l d the d e f e n d a n t h a r m l e s s t h e r e o n : 
1. C a b l e T.V. i n t h e amount o f $ 5 5 . 7 4 . 
2. I n d e b t e d n e s s t o p l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r i n 
t h e amount of $ 2 9 , 4 3 7 . 1 8 . 
3 . T e l e p h o n e c o m p a n y i n t h e a m o u n t o f 
$ 1 3 0 . 0 0 . 
4. I n d e b t e d n e s s to an a t t o r n e y in Co lorado 
for the r e c o v e r y of sheep in the amount of $ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
5. I n d e b t e d n e s s to Tom D a v i s in the amount 
o f $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
6. F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank in t h e amount o f 
$ 1 8 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
7. Acorn C r e d i t Union i n t h e amount of 
$ 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . 
8. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank i n t h e amount of 
$ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
9. C a s t l e v i e w H o s p i t a l in t h e amount of 
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$59 ,07 . 
B. Defendant s h a l l assume and pay the f o l l o w i n g 
o b l i g a t i o n s and hold p l a i n t i f f h a r m l e s s t h e r e o n : 
1. A l l amounts due and owing c o n c e r n i n g 
f ines in any criminal case in which defendant was i n v o l v e d . 
2. Patsy Grange in the amount of $3,000,00, 
3 . Aron G a l e H a n s e n in t h e amoun t of 
$3,500,00. 
$59,07. 
4. Castleview Hospital in the amount of 
5* Brad Holm in the amoun.t $135.00, 
6. Ken Anderton in the amount of $400.00, 
7. Ray Martineau in the amount of $650.00, 
10. Defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded 
the care, custody and control of the minor child of the 
parties subject to the following visitation rights provided 
the plaintiff properly demean himself: 
a. Second and fourth weekend of each month 
beginning 10:00 a.m. Saturday and concluding 6:00 p.m. 
Sunday, 
b. T.he plaintiff shall have visitation from 
10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.nu on the following holidays in the 
year 1986: Easter, July 4thr and Labor Day. The defendant 
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s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s in 1986: 
Memor ia l Day, J u l y 24 th and T h a n k s g i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t 
w i l l have the c h i l d for New Year ' s Day in 1987. T h e r e a f t e r 
t he p a r t i e s w i l l e x e r c i s e v i s i t a t i o n on a l t e r n a t i n g y e a r s . 
c . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on 
F a t h e r ' s Day each y e a r from 10:00 a.m. t o 6:00 p.m. The 
de fendan t s h a l l have the minor c h i l d on Mother ' s Day each 
year . 
d. Regarding the Chr i s tmas h o l i d a y : p l a i n t i f f 
s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 10:00 a.m. December 23 to 6:00 
p.m. December 24 d u r i n g t h e y e a r of 1986? d u r i n g t h e y e a r 
of 1987 p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 t o 6:00 p.m. December 26. T h e r e a f t e r s a i d 
v i s i t a t i o n w i l l a l t e r n a t e y e a r l y . 
e . B e g i n n i n g i n t h e y e a r 1987 t h e w e e k e n d 
v i s i t a t i o n w i l l e x t e n d to 7:00 p.m. F r i d a y n i g h t t o 6:00 
p.m. Sunday. 
f. P l a i n t i f f s h a l l have two (2) weeks v i s i t a t i o n 
dur ing the summer of 1986 beg inn ing a t 6:00 p.m. F r iday of 
t h e second weekend in June and c o n c l u d i n g t h e 4 t h weekend 
in June a t 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l g i v e 
d e f e n d a n t t e n (10) d a y s w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e d a t e which 
w i l l be the f i r s t day of h i s two (2) week v i s i t a t i o n . 
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g. In 1987 p l a i n t i f f s h a l l have t h r e e (3) weeks 
summer v i s i t a t i o n beginning the second weekend in June and 
concluding on the second weekend t h e r e a f t e r . 
11 , The d e f e n d a n t may c l a i m the minor c h i l d of t h e 
p a r t i e s as a d e d u c t i o n in the year 1985. T h e r e a f t e r t h e 
p l a i n t i f f may c la im the minor c h i l d as a deduction for tax 
purposes so long as he remains c u r r e n t in payment of h i s 
c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n . 
12, The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l pay the sum of $140.00 pe r 
month as and for c h i l d support. 
13, That i f court ordered c h i l d support becomes d e l i n -
quent as d e f i n e d by S e c t i o n 78-45d- l ' , U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, a l l c u r r e n t and p a s t due c h i l d s u p p o r t s h a l l 
t h e r e a f t e r be w i t h h e l d from the d e f e n d a n t ' s income in 
accordance with the r u l e s of p r a c t i c e of t h i s court . 
That t h i s order s h a l l remain in e f f e c t u n t i l t h e 
defendant no longer owes c h i l d support, and should app ly 
to a l l e x i s t i n g and future payors. 
14, That p l a i n t i f f maintain m e d i c a l , o p t i c a l and den-
t a l i n s u r a n c e on the minor c h i l d , so l o n g as t h e same i s 
a v a i l a b l e to him through h i s employment. Any amounts not 
paid by i n s u r a n c e w i l l be paid o n e - h a l f (1 /2) by each of 
the p a r t i e s . 
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15. Each pay s h a l l bear t h e i r own r e s p e c t i v e c o s t s and 
a t t o r n e y s 1 fees i ncu r r ed in t h i s m a t t e r . 
The C o u r t h a v i n g e n t e r e d t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of 
F a c t , now makes the f o l l o w i n g : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Tha t t h e C o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p a r t i e s 
h e r e t o and the s u b j e c t m a t t e r hereof . 
2. Tha t t h e p l a i n t i f f s h a l l be g r a n t e d a d i v o r c e 
from de fendan t . 
3. Tha t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l be g r a n t e d a d i v o r c e 
from p l a i n t i f f . 
4. D e f e n d a n t s h a l l be awarded t h e c a r e , c u s t o d y and 
c o n t r o l of t h e minor c h i l d of the p a r t i e s , t o - w i t : ARON 
JIM HANSEN, born October 14, 1983, s u b j e c t to the f o l l o w i n g 
v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s p rov ided the p l a i n t i f f p r o p e r l y demean 
h i m s e l f : 
a. Second and f o u r t h weekend of each month 
b e g i n n i n g 10:00 a.m. S a t u r d a y and c o n c l u d i n g 6:00 p.m. 
Sunday. 
b . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 
10:00 a.m. t o 6:00 p.m. on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s in t h e 
year 1986: E a s t e r , J u l y 4 th , and Labor Day. The de fendan t 
s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s in 1986: 
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Memorial Day, July 24th and Thanksgiving. The defendant 
will have the child for New Year's Day in 1987. Thereafter 
the parties will exercise visitation on alternating years. 
c. The plaintiff shall have visitation on 
Father's Day each year from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.. The 
defendant shall have the minor child on Mother's Day each 
year. 
d* Regarding the Christmas holiday: plaintiff 
shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. December 23 to 6:00 
p.m. December 24 during the year of 1986; during the year 
of 1987 plaintiff shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 to 6:00 p.m. December 26^ Thereafter said 
visitation will alternate yearly. 
e. Beginning in the year 1987 the weekend 
visitation will extend to 7:00 p.m. Friday night to 6:00 
p.m. Sunday* 
f. Plaintiff shall have two (2) weeks visitation 
during the summer of 1986 beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday of 
the second weekend in June and concluding the 4th weekend 
in June at 6:00 p.m.. on Sunday. The plaintiff shall give 
defendant ten (10) days written notice of the date which 
will be the first day of his two (2) week visitation. 
g* In 1987 plaintiff shall have three (3) weeks 
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summer visitation beginning the second weekend in June and 
concluding on the second weekend thereafter, 
5, The property accumulated by the parties during 
their marriage is to be awarded as per paragraph 7 a and b 
of the Findings of Fact* 
6. The plaintiff is awarded whatever interest that he 
may have in thirty-five (35) acres located near Cleveland, 
Emery County, State of Utah* 
7. The debts and obligations of the shall shall be 
disposed of pursuant to paragraph 9 A and B of the Findings 
of Fact* 
8. The defendant may claim the minor child of the 
parties as a deduction in the year 1985. Thereafter the 
plaintiff may claim the minor child as a deduction for tax 
purposes so long as he remains current in his child sup-
port, 
9* The plaintiff shall pay the sum of $140.00 per 
month as and for child support* 
10. That if court ordered child support becomes delin-
quent as defined by Section 78-45d-l, U.C«A«, 1953, as 
amended, all current and past due child support shall 
thereafter be withheld from the defendant's income in 
accordance with the rules of practice of this court. 
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That this order shall remain in effect until the 
defendant no longer owes child support, and should apply 
to all existing and future payors, 
11. That plaintiff maintain medical, optical and den-
tal insurance on the minor child, so long as the same is 
available to him through his employment. Any amounts not 
paid by insurance will be paid one-half (1/2) by each of 
the parties. 
12. Each pay shall bear their own respective costs and 
attorneys1 fees incurred in this matter. 
13. The Decree of Divorce issued herein shall become 
absolute and final upon its entry by the Clerk of the Court 
in the Register of Action. 
DATED this /*T~ day of /r/.V/' / , 1986. 
N ^ ^ /x'st / / 1 > Wt < U. 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the 8th day of April, 1986, I hereby mailed a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF 
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FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
George E. Mangan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
47 North Second East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
A. Lamar Hansen 
Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 257 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
Secretary 
JOHN E« SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
First Interstate Bank Bldg, 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: 637-178 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
a******************** 
A. LAMAR HANSEN, : 
AMENDED DECREE 
Plaintiff, : OF DIVQRCE 
vs. : 
CYNTHIA ANN HANSEN, : Civil No. 85-CV-42-D 
Defendant* s 
********************* 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
aoove-entitied Court on the 5th day of March, 1986, and the 
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, District Judge, presiding; 
and, the plaintiff having been personally present and 
represented by counsel, George E. Mangan and the defendant 
having been personally present and represented by counsel, 
John E. Schindler and the Court having heard the testimony 
presented and having considered same together with all 
exhibits of record and further having reviewed the file in 
this matter and being otherwise fully informed, and the 
Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law now, therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED gjTtx: 
7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE 
APR 2 11985 
ROGER \< M A D C T T ^ . 
Page Two 
1. That the plaintiff be and is hereby granted a 
divorce from the defendant. 
2. That the defendant be and is hereby granted a 
divorce from the plaintiff. 
3. That the defendant is hereby awarded the care, 
custody and control of the minor child of the parties, to-
wit: ARON JIM HANSEN, born October 14, 1,983 subject to 
plaintiff's visitation provided he properly demean himself: 
a. Second and fourth weekend of each month 
beginning 10:00 a.m. Saturday and concluding 6:00 p.m. 
Sunday. 
b. The plaintiff shall have visitation from 
10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the following holidays in the 
year 1986: Easter, July 4th, and Labor Day. The defendant 
shall have visitation on the following holidays in 1986: 
Memorial Day, July 24th and Thanksgiving. The defendant 
will have the child for New Year's Day in 1987. Thereafter 
the parties will exercise visitation on alternating years. 
c. The plaintiff shall have' visitation on 
Father's Day each year from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The 
defendant shall have the minor child on Mother's Day each 
year . 
d. Regarding the Christmas holiday: plaintiff 
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shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. December 23 to 6:00 
p.m. December 24 during the year of 1986; during the year 
of 1987 plaintiff shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 to 6:00 p.m. December 26. Thereafter said 
visitation will alternate yearly. 
e. Beginning in the year 1987 the weekend 
visitation will extend to 7:00 p.m. Friday night to 6:00 
p.m. Sunday. 
f. Plaintiff shall have two (2) weeks visitation 
during the summer of 1986 beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday of 
the second weekend in June and concluding the 4th weekend 
in June at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The plaintiff shall give 
defendant ten (10) days written notice of the date which 
will be the first day of his two (2) week visitation. 
g. In 1987 plaintiff shall have three (3) weeks 
summer visitation beginning the second weekend in June and 
concluding on the second weekend thereafter. 
4. That each party be and is hereby awarded the 
personal property currently in their possession with the 
following exceptions: 
a. One (1) 1974 Cadillac automobile shall be and 
is hereby awarded to the plaintiff. 
b. One (1) sewing table shall be and is hereby 
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awarded to the d e f e n d a n t . 
5. The p l a i n t i f f be and i s h e r e b y awarded w h a t e v e r 
i n t e r e s t t h a t he may have in t h i r t y - f i v e (35) a c r e s l o c a t e d 
near C l e v e l a n d , Emery County, S t a t e of Utah* 
6. That t h e p l a i n t i f f s h a l l a s s u m e and pay t h e 
f o l l o w i n g o b l i g a t i o n s and h o l d t h e d e f e n d a n t h a r m l e s s 
t h e r e o n : 
a. C a b l e T.V. i n t h e amount o f $ 5 5 * 7 4 . 
b . I n d e b t e d n e s s t o p l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r in t h e 
amount of $ 2 9 , 4 3 7 . 1 8 . 
c . Te lephone company in the amount of $130 .00 . 
d. I n d e b t e d n e s s t o an a t t o r n e y i n C o l o r a d o f o r 
the r e c o v e r y of sheep in the amount of $4 ,000 .00* 
e . I n d e b t e d n e s s t o Tom D a v i s i n t h e amount o f 
$ 7 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
f. F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank i n t h e a m o u n t o f 
$ 1 8 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
g. Acorn C r e d i t Union in the amount of $ 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . 
h. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank i n t h e a m o u n t o f 
$ 1 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
i. Castleview Hospital in the amount of 
$59.07. 
7. That the defendant shall assume and pay the 
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following obligations and hold plaintiff harmless thereon: 
a* All amounts due and owing concerning fines in 
any criminal case in which defendant was involved. 
b. Patsy Grange in the amount of $3,000,00. 
c. Aron Gale Hansen in the amount of $3,500.00. 
d. Castleview Hospital in the amount of $59.07. 
e. Brad Holm in the amount $135.00. 
f. Ken Anderton in the amount of $400.00. 
g. Ray Martineau in the amount of $650.00. 
8. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to maintain 
medical/ optical and dental insurance on the minor child, 
so long as the same is available to him through his employ-
ment. Any amounts not paid by insurance will be paid one-
half (1/2) by each of the parties. 
9. The defendant shall claim the minor child of the 
parties as a deduction in the year 1985. Thereafter the 
plaintiff shall claim the minor child as a deduction for 
tax purposes so long as he remains current in payment of 
his child support obligation. 
10. The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the sum of 
$140.00 per month as and for child support. 
11. That if court ordered child support becomes delin-
quent as defined by Section 78-45d-l, U.C.A., 1953, as 
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amended, a l l c u r r e n t and p a s t due c h i l d suppor t s h a l l 
t h e r e a f t e r be w i t h h e l d from the d e f e n d a n t ' s income in 
accordance with the ru l e s of p r ac t i ce of t h i s court . 
That t h i s o rder s h a l l remain in e f f e c t u n t i l the 
defendant no longer owes ch i ld support , and s h a l l apply to 
a l l e x i s t i n g and future payors* 
12. -Each pay i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d to pay t h e i r own 
r e s p e c t i v e c o s t s and a t t o r n e y s 1 fees i n c u r r e d in t h i s 
matter . 
13. The Decree of Divorce issued s h a l l become abso lu te 
and f i n a l upon i t s e n t r y by the C l e r k of the Court in the 
Register of Action. 
DATED t h i s /'S~~"~ day of / A - / V / 7 , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
•^RICHARD C. DAVIDSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the 8th day of April, 1986, I hereby mailed a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing DECREE OF 
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DIVORCE by depositing the same in the United States Mail* 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
George E, Mangan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
47 North Second East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
A, Lamar Hansen 
Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 257 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
Secretary 
Rule 52 UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE 
An objection couched in language such as 
"the instruction is not suggested by and is con-
trary to law/' or like terms, lacks the specific-
ity required by this rule. Morgan v. Quailbrook 
Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
—Specificity required. 
An objection to an instruction should be spe-
cific enough to bring to the attention of the 
court all claimed errors in the instructions and 
to give the court an opportunity to correct 
them if the court deems it proper. Employers' 
Mut. Liab. Ins Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah 
253, 25S P 2d 445 (1953). 
Explanation of grounds. 
To appeal the giving or the refusal of an in-
struction, a party must properly object to the 
instructions in the trial court and explain its 
grounds, with specificity, for challenging the 
instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. United States Fuel Co., 22 
Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. 
Newell J. Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 
2d 270, 480 P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. 
Harlin Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 
356 (1973); McGinn v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. 
Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. 
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hail, 
671 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983); Highland Constr. 
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984); Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 573 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 102. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial *» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
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grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
ment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preced- Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
ing "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted Cross-Referenccs. — Masters, Rule 53. 
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth 
sentence and added the last sentence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
-—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
In presence of court. 
Written. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 




Rule 3 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND 
ORDERS OF DISTRICT COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from all final orders and 
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure 
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal 
of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of 
attorney's fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order of a district court and their interests are such 
as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal, or may 
join in an appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of ap-
peal. Such joint appeals may thereafter proceed and be treated as a single 
appeal with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be consolidated by 
order of the Supreme Court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or 
by stipulation of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent. The title of the action 
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the Supreme Court, In original proceedings in the Su-
preme Court the party making the original application shall be known as the 
plaintiff and any other party as the defendant. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate that the appeal is taken to the Supreme Court 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at his last known 
address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
separate or joint notice of appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal 
shall pay to the clerk of the district court such filing fees as are established by 
law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the Supreme Court. The clerk 
of the district court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing and 
docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the district court shall forthwith trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together 
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the Supreme Court. Upon receipt of the 
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the Supreme 
Court shall thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the district court, with the 
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default from which the designated period of time 
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of 
the period shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the 
period extends until the end of the next day [whteh] 
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed is 
less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the 
computation. As used in this rule, 'legal holiday * 
includes days designated as holidays by the [Presi-
deii^ h»<^ngre^^of-t4ie4Jnit<Hi--Stat«r-oMh»-State 
oWtehl state and federal governments. 
(b) N o change. 
(c) N o change. 
(d) N o change. 
RULE 30. DECISION OF THE COURT: 
DISMISSAL; NOTICE OF DECISION 
(a) Decision in Civil Cases. 
The Court may reverse, afflrm1 or modify any 
order or judgment appealed from. [t except as othe-
pwis»-provided by lawt and mayj if the findings In 
any ease are incomplete! order the court OF agency 
from which the appeal was taken to add tot modify 
or complete the findings so as to make the same 
conform to the issues presented and the facts as the 
same may be found to be by the trial court or 
agency from the evidence, and may direct the trial 
court or agency to enter judgment in accordance 
with the findings when corrected
 t or may direct a 
new trial in any case, or further proceedings to be 
httdr] If the findings of fact in a case are incomplete, 
the Court may order the trial court or agency to 
supplement, modify, or complete the findings to 
make them conform to the issues presented and the 
facts as found from the evidence and may direct the 
trial court or agency to enter judgment in accord-
ance with the findings as revised. The Court may 
also order a new trial or further proceedings to be 
conducted. If a new trial is granted, the Court [wW] 
may pass upon and determine all questions of law 
involved in the case presented upon the appeal and 
necessary to the final determination of the case. 
(b) N o change. 
(c) N o change. 
(d) N o change. 
TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO COURT OF 
APPEALS 
RULE 42. REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, 
AND DECREES OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a 
judgment, an order, and a decree (herein referred to 
as "decisions*) of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
RULE 43. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING 
REVIEW OF CERTIORARI 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling 
nor wholly measuring the Court's discretion, indi-
cate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same 
issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a way 
that is in conflict with a decision of this Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a 
lower court as to call for an exercise of this Court's 
power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, slate, or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this Court. 
RULE 44. CERTIFICATION AND 
TRANSMISSION OF RECORD; FILING; 
PARTIES 
(a) Appearance, Docketing Fee, Filing, and Service. 
Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time 
provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by 
Rule 21, ten copies of a petition which shall comply 
in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the Court. 
Counsel for the petitioner shall serve four copies of 
the petition on counsel for each party separately 
represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the 
petitioner to notify all parties in the case of the date 
of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the 
case. Service and notice shall be given as required by 
Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and Separate Petitions. 
Parties interested jointly, severally, or otherwise 
in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of 
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition 
separately; or any two or more of them may join in 
a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be 
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or 
closely related questions, it will suffice to file a 
single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all 
the cases. 
(c) Cross-Petition of Respondent. 
Counsel for a respondent wishing to file a cross-
petition shall, within the time provided by Rule 
45(d), pay the certiorari docketing fee and file, with 
proof of service as prescribed by Rule 21, ten copies 
of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari which 
shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The cross-
petition will then be placed on the certiorari docket 
Counsel for the cross-petitioner shall serve four 
copies of the cross-petition on counsel for each 
party separately represented. It shall be the duty of 
counsel for the cross-petitioner to notify all parties 
in the case of the date of the filing and of the cert-
iorari docket number of the case. Service and notice 
shall be given as required by Rule 21. A cross-
petition for a writ of certiorari may not be joined 
with any other filing; the Clerk shall not accept any 
filing so joined. 
(d) Parties. 
All parties to the proceeding in the Court of 
Appeals shall be deemed parties in this Court, unless 
the petitioner notifies the Clerk of this Court in 
writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of 
the parties below have no interest in the outcome of 
the petition. A copy of such notice shall be served 
on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party 
noted as no longer interested may remain a party by 
notifying the Clerk, with service on the other 
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parties, that the party has an Interest in the petition. 
(e) Motion for Certification and Transmission of 
Record. 
A party intending to file a petition for certiorari, 
prior to filing the petition or at any time prior to 
action by this Court on the petition, may file a 
motion for an order to have the Clerk of the Court / 
of Appeals certify the record, or any part of it, amr 
provide for its transmission to this Court. Motions 
to certify the record prior to action on the petition^ 
by the Court should rarely be made, only when the^ 
record is essential to this Court's proper understa-
nding of the petition or the brief in opposition and 
such understanding cannot be derived from the 
contents of the petition or the brief in opposition, 
including the appendix. (See Rule 46(a)(10).) If a 
motion is appropriate, it shall be made to this Court 
after the filing of a petition but prior to action by 
this Court on the petition, or in the case of a stay of 
execution of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
such a motion may be made before the filing of the 
petition. Thereafter, the Clerk of this Court or any 
party to the case may request that additional parts 
of the record be certified and transmitted to this 
Court. Copies of all motions for certification and 
transmission shall be sent to the parties to the pro-
ceeding. All motions and orders hereunder shall 
comply with and be subject to the requirements of 
Rule 23. 
R U L E ^ S T T I M E FOlfPETrnO^lNG 
Timeliness of Petition. 
erwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is 
filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be 
given to the other parties. No extension shall exceed 
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date^ of .entry ofv the order granting the motion, 
I ywliichever occurs later/ / 
RULE 46. PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
A petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
vith the Clerk of this Court within 30 days after the 
fcntry of the decision j>yihe Court of Appeals? 
(^Re4usaHir^etition. 
The Clerk will refuse to receive any petition for a 
writ of certiorari which is jurisdictional^ out of 
time. 
(c) Effect of Petition for Rehearing. 
The time for filing a petition for a writ of certi-
orari runs from the date the decision is entered by 
the Court of Appeals, not from the date of the iss-
uance of the remittitur. If, however, a petition for 
rehearing is timely filed by any party, the time for 
filing the petition for a writ of certiorari for all 
parties (whether or not they requested rehearing or 
joined in the petition for rehearing) runs from the 
date of the denial of rehearing or of the entry of a 
subsequent decision entered upon the rehearing. 
(d) Time for Cross-Petition, 
( 1 ) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari must 
be filed: 
(A) within the time provided in subdivisions (a) 
and (c) of this rule; or 
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition 
for a writ of certiorari. 
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to 
paragraph (d)(1)(B) of this rule will not be granted 
unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of 
another party lothe-caseis 
(e) Extension of Time. 
This Court, upon a showing of excusablc^heglect 
•net 
r good cause, may extend the time for filing a 
p ition or a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari 
uponimotion filed not later than 30 days after /the 
expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphia) 
or (c) cftjhis rule, whichever is applicable. Ap? such 
motion which is filed before expiration ofrfhc pres-
cribed time nia>4ag_cx parte, imiess^ttle Court oth~ 
CERTIORARI 
(a) Contents^ 
^TficP petition for a writ of certiorari shall contain, 
in the order here indicated: 
(1)A list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed, 
except where the caption of the case in this Court 
contains the names of all parties. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabeti-
cally arrange4-^d^JKJlh^parallel cijalion^r-agency^ 
rules! court rulesX^tatuteSj) and (uuhorities cited,,, 
with references^to trir'pages of theTretition "wfiere 
they are cited. 
(4) The questions presented for review, expre-
ssed in the terms and circumstances of the case but 
without unnecessary detail. The statement of the 
questions should be short and concise and should 
not be argumentative or repetitious. General concl-
usory statements, such as "the decision of the Court 
of Appeals is not supported by the law or facts/ 
are not acceptable. The statement of a question 
presented will be deemed to comprise every subsid-
iary question fairly included therein. Only the que-
stions set forth in the petition or fairly included 
therein will be considered by the Court. 
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial 
reports of any opinions issued by the Court of 
Appeals. 
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on 
which the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked, 
showing: 
(A) the date of the entry of the decision 
sought to be reviewed; 
(B) the date of the entry of any order respe-
cting a rehearing and the date of the entry and 
terms of any order granting an extension of time 
within which to petition for certiorari; 
(C) reliance upon Rule 44(c), where a cross-
petition for a writ of certiorari is filed, stating the 
filing date of the petition for a writ of certiorari in 
connection with which the cross-petition is filed; 
and 
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer 
on this Court jurisdiction to review the decisionin 
question by a writ of certiorari. _ -—^ ^ " ^ 
7) Controlling provisions of Constitutions » ^ 
ordinances, and regulations that Hi 
involves, setting them o\jfverbatim and giving the 
appropriate citation therefbrr^lf the controlling 
provisions involved are lengthy, their citation alone 
will suffice at this point and their pertinent text shall 
be set forth in the appendix referred to in subpara-
graph (10) ofibiLTiaragfapfo—-^ 
(8) A sfeejnenToT thejase^The statement shall 
first indicate briefly theTnature of the~cajc> the 
<grju7sc ofltig_pjQceedings, and its tflspositloVin the 
lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for reviewi_jHi_ 
statements oJLfact and references to the proceeff nes 
below shaj^bc supported by~citations to the record 
frefore a n d t9. Itf W'"*0" o f ^ e CQurt oIAppeals 
(9) With respect to each question presented, a 
direct and concise argument for the issuance of the 
* • 
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writ. (See Ri fUl#45fFr"N 
h appendix Jo (10) A i /c ntaining, In the following 
order; v ^ _ . ^ X ^ ^ v 
(A) copies of all opinions J including concur* 
ring and dissenting opinions, and all orders, inclu-
ding any order on rehearing, delivered by the Court 
of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be 
reviewed; r***^ *"" *^ *% 
(B) copies of (aqy, other opinions, findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, orders, juagments, or 
(dgcges that were rendered in the case or~ in compa-
moiT cases by the Court of Appeals ^ and by otherS 
linistrative agencies ana mat are /cggts^br by administrative agencie 
relevant to the questions presented (each of those 
documents shall include the caption showing the 
name of the issuing court or agency, the title and 
number of the case, and the date of its entry); and 
(C) any othcr~judicial or administrative opi-
nions or orders that are relevant to the questions 
presented but were not entered in the case that is the 
subject of the petition. 
If the material that is required by subparagr-
aphs (7) and (10) of this paragraph is voluminous, 
such may, if more convenient, be separately prese-
nted. 
(b) Form of Petition 
The peti 
^whitejlThe Clerk shall examine all petitions before 
* fig, and if a petition is not prepared in accorcU 
ance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and this paragraph, it 
will not be filed, but shall be returned to be prop-
erly prepared. 
(c) No Separate Brief. 
All contentions in support of a petition for a writ 
of certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the 
petition, as provided in subparagraph (a)(9) of this 
rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a 
writ of certiorari will be received, and the Clerk will 
refuse to file any petition for a writ of certiorari to 
which is annexed or appended any supporting brief. 
(d) Page Limitation. 
The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as 
short as possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, 
excluding the subject index, the table of authorities, 
any verbatim quotations required by subparagraph 
(a)(7) of this rule, and the appendix. 
(e) Absence of Accuracy, Brevity, and Clarity. 
The failure of a petitioner to present with accu-
racy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a 
ready and adequate understanding of the points 
requiring consideration will be a sufficient reason 
for denying the petition. 
RULE 47. BRIEF IN OPPOSITION; REPLY 
BRIEF; BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
(a) Brief in Opposition. 
The respondent shall have 30 days (unless enla-
rged by the Court pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after 
service of a petition in which to file ten copies of an 
opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why 
the case should not be reviewed by this Court. Such 
brief shall comply with the requirements of Rule 46, 
as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief 
as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the 
cover of the brief shall be orange. The Clerk shall 
examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not 
prepared in accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and 
with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall 
be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of 
the brief shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on 
counsel for each party separately represented. 
(b) Page Limitation. 
A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible 
and may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, 
excluding the subject index, the table of authorities, 
any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), 
and the appendix. 
(c) Objections to Jurisdiction. 
No motion by a respondent to dismiss a petition 
for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections 
to the jurisdiction of the Court to grant the writ of 
certiorari may be included in the brief in opposition. 
(d) Distribution of Filings. 
Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the exp-
iration of the time allowed therefor, or express 
waiver of the right to file, the petition and the brief, 
if any, will be distributed by the Clerk to the Court 
for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for 
a writ of certiorari has been filed, distribution of 
both it and the petition for a writ certiorari will be 
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by 
the cross-respondent, the expiration of the time 
allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to 
file. 
(c) Reply Brief. 
A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised 
in the brief in opposition may be filed by any peti-
tioner, but distribution under paragraph (d) hereof 
will not be delayed pending the filing of any such 
brief. Such brief shall be as short as possible, but 
may not exceed five pages. Such brief shall comply 
with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(1)-
(3), except that the cover of the brief shall be 
yellow. The Clerk shall examine all briefs before 
filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance 
with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it 
will not be filed, but shall be returned to be prop-
erly prepared. Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, 
and four copies shall be served as prescribed by 
Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. 
(f) Brief of Amicus Curiae. 
A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if 
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by 
leave of the Court granted on motion, or at the 
request of the Court. A motion for leave shall ide-
ntify the interest of the applicant and shall state the 
reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae is desirable. 
Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus 
curiae shall file its brief within the time allowed the 
party whose position it will support, unless the 
Court for cause shown shall grant leave for later 
filing, in which event it shall specify within what 
period an opposing party may answer. Such brief 
shall comply with the requirements of Rule 46, as 
applicable, and comply with the form of briefs as 
specified in Rule 27(a), with the cover of the brief 
being green. The brief may not exceed 20 pages, 
excluding the subject index, the table of authorities, 
any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), 
and the appendix. Ten copies of the brief shall be 
filed, and four copies shall be served as prescribed 
by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately 
represented. 
RULE 48. DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
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